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I. INTRODUCTION
After many years of a booming, highly profitable housing market,
in late 2008 the United States experienced the largest price drop in
homes in the nation’s history.1  U.S. home values plummeted by al-
most 30% in October of 2008.2  This drop was almost double the num-
ber registered in the United States during the Great Depression.3
Many experts believe that the bursting of the housing bubble was the
catalyst for the recession that originated at the same time.4  Since the
housing crisis, many proposals have been set forth attempting to pro-
vide a solution for the crisis the United States faces.  However, no
proposal has created such a buzz, or has been so well received, as that
of Robert Hockett.5  Hockett is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School whose principal teaching, research, and writing interests lie in
the fields of organizational, financial, and monetary law and
economics.6
Hockett’s solution to the underwater mortgage crisis contains many
complexities.  One of the purposes of this Comment is to adequately
explain those complexities.  However, this will be done with a bigger
purpose in mind—to prove that Hockett’s solution is not an ethically
correct or appropriate solution for the current crisis.  A more detailed
explanation of Hockett’s proposal is contained in part II of this Com-
ment, but the fundamental idea that Hockett puts forth is as follows.
First, Hockett suggests that local municipalities use their eminent
domain power to take underwater mortgages from banks at a price
1. Alan Libel, Home Price Index Posts Largest Drop in 17-Year History, USA
TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-05-22-home-
prices-drop_N.htm (last updated May 22, 2008).
2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises
4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14656, 2009), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w14656.pdf?new_window=1.
3. Id.
4. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN-
QUIRY 120 (2009), http://www.uvu.edu/woodbury/docs/summaryoftheprimarycauseof
thehousingbubble.pdf.
5. The Century Foundation, Robert C. Hockett-Fellow, http://tcf.org/experts/de-
tail/robert-c.-hockett (last visited Aug. 21, 2014) (explaining Professor Hockett’s biog-
raphy to those unfamiliar with his work).
6. Id.
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that would “justly compensate” the banks.7  “Just compensation”
would equal the fair market value of the home in the current housing
market.8  These mortgages would then be bought by private investors
who would in turn begin receiving the homeowner’s mortgage pay-
ment.9  These private investors are incentivized by a profit that is “cre-
ated” as a result of the deal.10  Then, in the end, those with
underwater mortgages are provided with a new mortgage that is equal
to the value of their home in the present market.11
Hockett’s proposal has produced much debate.  There are schools
of people eager to either defend or devour his solution.12  Whether
the proposal will be productive in an economic sense and whether the
proposal is constitutional has been of much debate in recent months.13
While both of these issues should be determining factors in deciding
whether to implement the solution, the two issues are both beyond the
scope of this Comment.  The purpose of this Comment is to address
Hockett’s proposal from an ethical prospective.  Although the eco-
nomic and constitutional consequences of Hockett’s proposal are still
highly in debate, there seems to be a lack of ethical reflection on the
issue.  As a prospective attorney, the Author understands that legal
issues are based on the law rather than on what is “ethical” or what is
“right.” However, when determining what the law should be or what
the current law is meant to express, it is important to look at the mat-
ter from an ethical prospective.
The Author’s purpose is to show the American community—and
specifically the legal community—how and why Hockett’s proposal is
not an ethically correct or appropriate solution for the underwater
mortgage crisis.  To achieve this end, the Author will give a detailed
explanation of Professor Hockett’s proposal in Part II.  Next, the Au-
thor will set forth Hockett’s explanation of what caused the underwa-
ter mortgage crisis in Part III.  In Part IV the Author will provide his
7. Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and
Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 150–51 (2013).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent
Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 19 Cur-
rent Issues in Econ. and Fin. No. 5, 2013, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current
_issues/cil9-5.pdf.
11. Hockett, supra note 7, at 151.
12. See generally Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The
Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of the Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 949 (2008); David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmenta-
tion Principle in State Property Law (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons,
Working Paper No. 186, 2009); Andrew Peace, Coming Up for Air: The Constitution-
ality of Using Eminent Domain to Condemn Underwater Mortgages, 54 B. C. L. REV.
2167 (2013).
13. A quick Google search will provide numerous articles on whether Hockett’s
plan is economically sound or constitutional.
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own belief on what the cause of the underwater mortgage crisis is.
Then, after showing how Hockett does not assess the cause of the un-
derwater mortgage crisis correctly, the Author will then show the
reader how Hockett’s solution is not ethically appropriate in Part V.
This Comment will evaluate the ethical resolve of Hockett’s solution
using the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.  However, the Au-
thor is confident that if the reader is willing to inspect Hockett’s solu-
tion against the facts of what created the underwater mortgage crisis,
the reader will then develop an intuitive sense for why Hockett’s solu-
tion is neither ethically correct nor appropriate.
II. ROBERT HOCKETT’S EMINENT DOMAIN SOLUTION
Robert Hockett’s eminent domain solution contains many detailed
complexities that are beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, to
understand the overall message of this Comment, the fundamental
idea of Hockett’s solution must be understood.  This Section will ex-
plain Hockett’s proposal only to the extent needed to lay a foundation
for the ultimate purpose of this Comment—to show both how and
why Hockett’s proposal is not an ethically correct or appropriate solu-
tion to the underwater mortgage crisis.  Also, it must be remembered
that Hockett’s solution requires action at the municipal level.  There-
fore, this general overview cannot and does not attempt to explain
nuances between what one municipality may choose to do in compari-
son to another municipality.  Rather, this Section is intended to ex-
plain the general similarities that will be carried out by any
municipality that chooses to implement Professor Hockett’s proposal.
As explained, the first step in Hockett’s proposal asks local munici-
palities to use their eminent domain power to take the underwater
mortgages from banks that own the underwater mortgages.14  The
banks must then be “justly compensated.”  In other words, the banks
must be given the fair market value of the homes under the current
housing market.15  On a related note, Hockett views this issue as being
locally based in that certain areas of the United States have been and
are being affected by this crisis much more than other areas.16  There-
fore, Hockett believes that local municipalities are much better quali-
fied to address the problem than the federal government is, and he
believes that these municipalities should implement Hockett’s solu-
14. Hockett, supra note 7, at 150–51.
15. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings
and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 151–52 (2013).
16. Id. at 152.
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tion.17  One benefit of a local solution is that it would allow for munic-
ipalities to tailor their plans to their local circumstances.18
In order to purchase these mortgages, municipalities deposit inves-
tor-supplied funds in state-administered escrow accounts maintained
only for this purpose.19  The amount deposited, as mandated by law,
equals the probable just compensation ultimately to be paid for the
condemned mortgages.20  Probable just compensation is determined
via municipality-procured appraisals.21  Once the underwater mort-
gages are acquired, each municipality, in cooperation with the private
investors, comes to an agreement on the amount the homeowners pay
the private investors for the mortgage.22  This agreement is made pur-
suant to criteria commonly employed by ordinary market lenders like
the Federal Housing Administration.23
In the end, this process results in providing those with underwater
mortgages with a new mortgage rate that is much closer to the value
of their mortgage in today’s market as opposed to what their mort-
gage was worth at the time when the individual purchased the home.24
In theory, this is a great idea.  However, the Author proposes that
while Hockett’s solution may be theoretically sound, it lacks the abil-
ity to be practically sound or ethically appropriate.
III. ROBERT HOCKETT’S EXPLANATION OF WHAT CAUSED THE
CRISES AND THE REASONING FOR HIS SOLUTION
In order for a person to make an educated decision that Hockett’s
proposal is not the ethically correct or appropriate solution for the
underwater mortgage crisis, two issues must be understood.  First, the
fundamentals of Hockett’s solution must be understood.  This has
been discussed in Part II of this Comment.  The second issue that must
be understood is Professor Hockett’s perception of the problem and
the reasoning he employs to account for his solution.  Once this has
been explained, the framework will have been laid to show how Hock-
ett’s proposal is neither an ethically correct nor appropriate solution
to the underwater mortgage crisis.
Professor Hockett believes that the current underwater mortgage
crisis was created by individuals who were acting rationally.25  Hockett
claims that because these individuals were acting in a rational manner,
17. Id.
18. Robert Hockett & John Vlahoplus, A Federalist Blessing in Disguise: From
National Inaction to Local Action on Underwater Mortgages, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 253, 268 (2013).
19. Hockett, supra note 7, at 154.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 151.
25. Hockett, supra note 7, at 138.
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the housing crisis was unavoidable absent major Federal interven-
tion.26  While Federal intervention certainly could have helped the
current underwater mortgage crisis, the crisis should not have been
preventable only through Federal intervention.  Hockett also asserts
that when looking at all the concerned parties of the underwater mort-
gage crisis, each party made blameless decisions with the possible ex-
ception of the central bank.27  Hockett further explains that the act of
parties acting in a financially defensible manner is what enabled the
bubble to form.28  As expressed by him, Professor Hockett holds that
to attempt to identify and hold accountable the responsible parties is a
frivolous pursuit.29
Finally, Hockett states that rather than wasting time pointing the
finger at anybody—home buyer, lender, or market investor—what the
country should really focus on is the need to clean up the present
wreckage.30  Professor Hockett believes that the individuals who cre-
ated the problem are no better positioned collectively to fix the prob-
lem than they were to create it.31  To best show how Professor
Hockett views the current crisis and how he proposes solving it, the
Author provides the following quote from Hockett.
It should be kept in mind in considering the foregoing [solution]
that the purpose of the [solution] is not to bail out the borrower; the
policy analysis does not depend on the morality of the borrower’s or
the lender’s prior actions in taking or making a toxic mortgage loan.
The purpose is to save the neighbor, the community, and the city
itself . . . .32
While what Hockett is attempting to accomplish is admirable, the
Author believes that Hockett’s perception of the underwater mort-
gage crisis does not fully explain the causation of the crisis.  The fol-
lowing Section will be devoted to explaining that there is actually a
specific reason for the collapse of the housing market.  This should
bring light to how and why Hockett’s solution is not an ethically cor-
rect or appropriate solution to the underwater mortgage crisis.
IV. THE AUTHOR’S EXPLANATION OF WHAT CAUSED THE
CURRENT UNDERWATER MORTGAGE CRISIS
During the significant period of time devoted to reading Professor
Hockett’s writings concerning his solution to the underwater mort-
gage crisis, the Author became troubled by what he could not find.
Specifically, the Author was never able to find a full and adequate
26. Id.
27. Id. at 132.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 130.
30. Hockett, supra note 7, at 130.
31. Id.
32. Hockett, supra note 18, at 267.
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description of the underwater mortgage crisis—one that fully explains
both the causes and reveals the culprits of the crisis.  As clarified
above, Hockett has expressed that the mortgage crisis was inevitable
and based on people making financially rational decisions.33  The Au-
thor must disagree.  In fact, the Author strongly disagrees.  Therefore,
the Author will now attempt to show the true catalyst of the underwa-
ter mortgage crisis.
Unfortunately, there is still much debate over what exactly caused
the mortgage crisis of 2008.  However, this outside debate does not
shake the Author’s belief that he can show, at the very least, the chief
component that created the crisis.  Furthermore, the Author also be-
lieves that Hockett’s solution becomes clearly inappropriate from an
ethical standpoint once the chief cause of the underwater mortgage
crisis becomes apparent.  Thus, the Author will now show that the cri-
sis is largely attributable to the deregulation of the financial market
that began in the early 1970s and the many horrific consequences that
followed as a direct result of this deregulation.34
A. A Brief History of What Led to the Crisis
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, it was nearly universally
believed that unregulated financial markets were inherently unstable,
subject to fraud and manipulation by insiders, and capable of causing
great economic crisis and political and social unrest.35  Therefore, in
order to protect the country from these dangers, in the mid-1930s the
United States government created a strict financial regulatory system
that was largely kept in place through the 1960s.36  This new model
was based on the economic philosophies of Maynard Keynes and Hy-
man Minsky.37  Their ideas generated a change in the American policy
perspective of financial markets that was supportive of tight financial
market regulation.38
Then, the financial turbulence felt in the 1970s and early 1980s led
to another policy regime shift concerning financial market regula-
tion.39  Efficient financial market theory and new classical macro the-
ory began to replace the conservative Keynesian and Minskian
views.40  The existing system of tight financial market regulation was
33. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings
and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 138 (2013).
34. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical As-
sessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture,’ 33 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
563 (2009), http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/33/4/563.full.pdfthtml.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 563–64.
39. Crotty, supra note 34, at 564.
40. Id.
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thus deconstructed through radical deregulation that was pushed by
financial institutions that were justifying this new and efficient market
theory.41  These developments then led to the current globally-inte-
grated, deregulated financial market.42
B. The Creation of the Crisis
By the time George W. Bush took office in 2001, the United States
financial sector was more powerful than ever before due to the crea-
tion of derivatives43 and the inability to regulate these derivatives be-
cause of the shift in American financial market theory.44  During this
time there were five investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stan-
ley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Stearns), two financial
conglomerates (Citigroup and JP Morgan) and three credit rating
agencies (Moody’s, Standards & Poor’s, and Fitch) were dominating
the financial industry. 45
The driving force behind these companies was a newly created de-
rivative named a Collateralized Debt Obligation, or “CDO.”46  These
CDOs are a collection of mortgage-backed securities and other loans
including car loans, corporate debt, credit-card debt, etc.47  Once the
CDOs are created, they are then sold to investors so that banks can
quickly recover the money they just distributed for the loans.48
In the old system of Keynes and Minsky, when a homeowner made
his or her mortgage payment every month, this payment went back to
whomever the homeowner borrowed the money from—usually the
bank.49  These lenders were in turn very careful about whom they
loaned money to.50  This caution was only exacerbated by the fact that
mortgages take decades to pay back.51
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Toma´s˘ Krˇizˇek, Legal Nature and Definition of Financial Derivatives (Oct. 24,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948686.
44. Vania Stavrakeva, Derivative Regulation—Why Does It Matter?, FORBES
(Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/lbsbusinessstrategyreview/
2013/09/24/derivative-regulation-why-does-it-matter/.
45. INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010) (a paginated copy of the transcript to
this Academy Award winning documentary can be found at http://www.sonyclassics.
com/awards - information / insidejob_screenplay.pdf) (the following citation can be
found on page 22 of the transcript).
46. Id. at 23.
47. Kay Giesecke & Baeho Kim, Risk Analysis of Collateralized Debt Obligations,
59 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 32 (2011), http://biz.korea.ac.kr/~baehokim/research/risk
analysis.pdf.
48. Ernest N. Biktimirov & Don Cyr, Using Inside Job to Teach Business Ethics,
117 J.  BUS. ETHICS 209, 210 (2013).
49. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 23.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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However, in the new system, lenders sell mortgages to investment
banks such as those listed above.52  Then, these investment banks pay
the rating agencies to evaluate the CDOs and determine whether buy-
ing a particular CDO would be a good investment.53  After receiving a
grade, these CDOs are then sold by the investment banks to private
investors.54  Thus, in today’s system, when homeowners pay their
mortgages the money travels to investors across the globe.55  This, in
turn, means that money cannot be followed and monitored like it was
in days past.
It is easy to see why this new deregulated financial market system
quickly became a ticking time bomb.  The new system created a struc-
ture that allows the lenders, grading agencies, and investment banks
to work exclusively and symbiotically toward their own financial ad-
vantage without any regulation of, or consequences for, poor lending,
poor grading, or poor investing.56  Lenders no longer have to worry
about whether borrowers can or will repay them because the lenders
know that the mortgage will be bought by an investment bank.57  The
lenders know that the mortgage will be purchased by an investment
bank because the more CDOs the investment banks sell to private
investors the higher the investment bank’s profits will be.58  The in-
vestment bank knows that they will be able to sell their CDOs to in-
vestors because the investment bank pays the rating agency, and if the
investment bank is not getting AAA ratings (the highest rating possi-
ble) for their CDOs then the investment banks can simply choose an-
other grading agency to work with.  This practice is possible because
grading agencies have no liability if their ratings of a CDO prove in-
correct.59  Therefore, again, the United States financial market has
eventually become so unregulated that it now allows lenders, grading
agencies, and investment banks to act in their own self-interest, with-
out consequence, and at the expense of our society.  This deregulation
created what the media calls “the bubble,” or, what should really be
52. Id.
53. William Alden, Rating Agencies Repeatedly Caved to Banks’ Demands and
Helped Cause Crisis, Report Finds, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/04/14/rating-agencies-financial-crisis_n_849410.html (last updated June 14,
2011).
54. Biktimirov, supra note 48, at 210.
55. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 23.
56. Alissa Brunetti, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse 2, http://www.trustinorganizations.com/Resources/Documents/Wall_Street_
and_the_Financial_Crisis_Anatomy_of_a_Financial_Collapse_-_Alissa_Brunetti_up
load.pdf.
57. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 23.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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known as: the complete and total fabrication of the price of a group of
assets (CDOs) that is not justified by the actual price of those assets.60
Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator of The Financial
Times, described the current financial market system as not creating
real profits or real income.61  Wolf further stated that money is simply
being created by the system, and that in retrospect the system is a
global Ponzi scheme.62
C. The Consequences of the Crisis, Including Those Going
Without Consequence
Once the country realized there was not as much money in the sys-
tem as alleged by those who created the underwater mortgage crisis,
on October 4th, 2008, President Bush signed a $700 billion dollar
bailout bill that would in essence put real currency into the financial
market made of fraudulent monetary reports.63  In other words, hun-
dreds of billions of dollars were given to the various companies listed
at the beginning of this Section—the same companies that not only
crippled the American housing market but also the global economy.64
And, in what seems to be an adding insult to injury fashion, the top
five executives at Lehman Brothers made over a billion dollars be-
tween 2000 and 2007.65  Then, once the firm went bankrupt, the exec-
utives were somehow allowed to keep all of this money.66  In like
fashion, Stan O’Neil, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, received $90 million
in 2006 and 2007 alone.67  Then, after driving the firm into the ground,
Merrill Lynch’s board of directors allowed O’Neil to resign and collect
$161 million in severance.68
In the five years following the financial collapse, not one executive
from any of these financial institutions have been criminally
charged.69  Not one.  There is no denying that those who created the
financial crisis that began in late 2008 have had little to no conse-
quences for driving the economy into the ground.70  It should be noted
that over the last decade the financial services industry has made
roughly $5 billion dollars’ worth of political contributions to the
60. NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/e/economic-bubble (last
visited Feb. 28, 2014).
61. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 25.
62. Id. at 26.
63. Dina Temple-Raston, Bush Signs $700 Billion Financial Bailout Bill, NPR,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95336601 (last updated Oct. 8,
2008).
64. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 53.
65. Id. at 56.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Biktimirov, supra note 48, at 212.
70. Id.
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United States.71  The Author has no proof that these contributions
play a factor in why these executives have had no criminal charges
brought against them, but one may speculate that a $5 billion contri-
bution could be the cause.
D. Why Robert Hockett’s Explanation of the Crisis is Inadequate
After this explanation of what the deregulation of the American
financial market has done to cause the underwater mortgage crisis,
there should now be a clear distinction between how Professor Hock-
ett describes the collapse of the housing market as opposed to the
Author’s explanation of the collapse.  Professor Hockett barely ac-
knowledges the deregulation of the American financial market and
how deregulation was a major, if not the complete, catalyst for the
current underwater mortgage crisis.72  Furthermore, while only devot-
ing two paragraphs to the deregulation of the American financial mar-
ket, Hockett spends approximately ten pages attempting to explain
that the underwater mortgage crisis is the result of “rational
thinking.”73
That Hockett did not adequately address the cause of the current
underwater mortgage crisis is the primary reason why the Author
chose to address this topic.  The Author can find no reason why Hock-
ett would purposely withhold this information from the public—a
public who looks to experts such as Professor Hockett to provide
them with the information necessary to make an informed decision
about the current underwater mortgage crisis.
Unfortunately, the average person is not equipped with the infor-
mation required to decipher whether Professor Hockett has fully ad-
dressed the causes that crippled the housing market.  This is why the
Author finds it so important to pass the correct information along to
the general public.  The Author would like to assume that Professor
Hockett did not think it necessary to address this issue in more detail.
Alternatively, maybe Hockett did not think that an explanation such
as that just given would be important when deciding the best route to
take in rescuing the country from the underwater mortgage crisis.
However, this does not seem to be the case.  Whether due to oversight
or ulterior motives, Professor Hockett egregiously omits information
that is paramount to understanding the crisis and in determining an
ethical and proper solution.  When the full cause of the crisis is dis-
closed, Professor Hockett’s solution cannot and will not be born by an
informed public.  If the government chooses to deal with the current
underwater mortgage crisis by placing the blame where it belongs,
71. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 60.
72. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings
and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 126 (2013).
73. Id. at 126–136.
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forcing those individuals to be liable for their actions, then Professor
Hockett’s solution will no longer be viable.
E. How Robert Hockett’s Explanation of the Crisis is Inadequate
As explained earlier, Professor Hockett asserts that the underwater
mortgage crisis was created by unavoidable, financially rational deci-
sion-making.74  It should now be clear that this is untrue.75  In fact,
Hockett’s statement is in direct opposition to the real cause of the
current underwater mortgage crisis.  The executives at these financial
institutions clearly knew what they were doing76, and the situation cer-
tainly could have been avoided if there was any practical regulation of
the American financial markets.77  More than that, the underwater
mortgage crisis could have been avoided if these executives at the
lending institutions, grading agencies, and investment banks did not
knowingly decide to act in their own financial self-interest with no
concern for the economic well-being of the rest of the nation.78
Another issue that becomes clear after learning how and why the
financial market collapsed is the fact that one logical solution to the
problem—to hold the lending institutions, grading agencies, invest-
ment banks, and their executives responsible for the problem that
they created—has not been implemented.79  Within Bank of America,
Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Mor-
gan, just to name a few, not one senior officer has been sued to date.80
One of the many reasons why Professor Hockett’s solution is not an
ethically correct or appropriate solution to the underwater mortgage
crisis is because it does not hold accountable the people who created
the underwater mortgage crisis.  However, this is certainly not the
only reason.
F. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s Opinion
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created under the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act that was passed by the United
States Congress and signed by President Obama in May of 2009.81
This ten-member panel was composed of private citizens with experi-
ence in the areas of housing, economics, finance, market regulation,
74. Id. at 126–138.
75. Reference the sub-section “Creation of the Crisis.”
76. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN-
QUIRY REPORT xxii (2011) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.
pdf [hereinafter Crisis Report].
77. Id. at xviii.
78. Id. at xxii.
79. See generally Ernest N. Biktimirov & Don Cyr, Using Inside Job to Teach Bus-
iness Ethics, 117 J.  BUS. ETHICS 209, 212 (2013).
80. Id.
81. History of the Commission, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://
fcic.law.stanford.edu/about/history (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
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banking, and consumer protection.82  Six of the Commission’s mem-
bers were appointed by the Democratic leadership of Congress and
four by the Republican leadership.83  The Commission’s statutory in-
structions contained twenty-two specific issues that should be investi-
gated, and it asked the commission to examine the collapse of the
major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for
the $700 billion bail-out bill.84
In their final report published in January of 2011, the Financial Cri-
sis Inquiry Commission used variations of the “fraud” at least 157
times when describing what caused the crisis.85  The Commission con-
cluded that there was a “systemic breakdown,” not just in accountabil-
ity, but also in ethical behavior.86  Furthermore, the Commission
found the signs of fraud everywhere, and the number of reports of
suspected mortgage fraud rose twenty-fold between 1998 and 2005
and then doubled again the next four years.87  The Commission
reached nine main conclusions that it published in The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,88
some of which will now be quoted:
We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable . . . We conclude a
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with cri-
sis . . . We conclude there was a systematic breakdown in accounta-
bility and ethics . . . We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending
standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread
the flame of contagion and crisis . . . We conclude the failures of
credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial
destruction.89
Another reason why Hockett’s solution is troublesome is that while
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—a commission elected by
the United States Congress for the purpose of determining the cause
of the financial collapse—is quoted as saying that the underwater
mortgage crisis was avoidable90, Professor Hockett claims the com-
plete opposite.91  Hockett specifically states that it was “rational and
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 76, at xvii-xxv.
89. Id.
90. Id. at xvii.
91. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings
and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation,
and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 138 (2013).
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indeed unavoidable . . . for individual market actors to enter into
transactions that ultimately aggregated into the bubble.”92  Yet, the
Commission explains that mortgages were being falsely attributed
creditworthiness that then became the sole collateral for highly lever-
aged securities.93  These securities were then marked to have the high-
est credit rating possible given by the credit rating agencies.94
Therefore, after the Committee explained that mortgages were given
completely fabricated creditworthiness, Professor Hockett attempts to
convince the general public that the crisis was unavoidable and was
created by rational decision-making.
V. HOW ROBERT HOCKETT’S SOLUTION IS NOT AN ETHICALLY
CORRECT SOLUTION ACCORDING TO THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
A significant portion of this Comment has been devoted to explain-
ing the lack of ethical decision-making that created the current under-
water mortgage crisis and to explaining the solution Professor Hockett
poses to fix the problem.  Moreover, as explained early in this Com-
ment, this was done in order to set up the main purpose of this Com-
ment—to show how and why Professor Hockett’s solution is not an
ethically correct or appropriate solution to the underwater mortgage
crisis.  While it is important that a problem of this magnitude be
solved quickly and efficiently, it is most important that the correct so-
lution be applied to the problem.  The Author argues that for a solu-
tion to be correct, it must also be ethical.  This is not the only
characteristic of a correct solution; however, it is an important charac-
teristic in determining a solution.  Thus, this ethical characteristic is
the focus of this Comment.  The purpose of this Section is to ade-
quately explain why Professor Hockett’s solution is not an ethically
correct solution to the underwater mortgage crisis.  To achieve this
end, the Author will utilize the legal philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas.
The legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, while complex, is
grounded in basic principles that can be universally understood and
applied to any situation.  This, in large part, is what motivated the
Author to use Aquinas’s legal philosophy to demonstrate how and
why Hockett’s solution is not ethically sound.  Specifically, the Author
will be utilizing Aquinas’s definition of justice.  The simplicity of
Aquinas’s definition of justice is helpful in that it can be applied to
any situation.  The Author’s purpose in this Section is to explain Aqui-
nas’s definition of justice, to practically apply this definition of justice
to the underwater mortgage crisis, and, through the application of
92. Id.
93. Rakoff, supra note 85, at 4.
94. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-1\TWR108.txt unknown Seq: 15 26-NOV-14 10:58
2014] ROBBING PETER AND BLAMING PAUL 161
Aquinas’s definition of justice, to prove that Professor Hockett’s solu-
tion is not ethically sound.
A. An Explanation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Definition of Justice
For Aquinas, justice is one of the four Cardinal Virtues, or moral
virtues, of which the other three are prudence, temperance, and cour-
age.95  Aquinas claims that the virtue of justice governs a person’s re-
lationship with others.96  Specifically, justice entails a constant
willingness to extend to each person what he or she deserves.97  While
Aquinas’s description of justice contains much complexity that is be-
yond what is necessary for this Comment, it should be acknowledged
that Aquinas alludes to a bifurcated explanation of justice—justice in
relation to the individual and justice in relation to the community.98
Justice in relation to the community is what Aquinas defines as legal
justice.99  In short, Aquinas states that the purpose of legal justice is to
govern a person’s actions according to the common good of the com-
munity.100  Interpreted this way, legal justice is a virtue that concerns
not individual benefits but the welfare of the community.101  Further-
more, each member of the community relates to that community as a
part relates to a whole—the part being the individual and the whole
being the community.102  Thus, it logically follows that anything that
affects an individual in a community also affects the community as a
whole.  Likewise, the actions of the individual in the community can
and will effect the community as a whole.  Thus, again, that which is
focused on the common good of the community is defined as being
legally just according to Aquinas.103  The Author will now show that
Hockett’s solution is not ethically correct nor appropriate because it is
not in the best interest of the American community.
B. Robert Hockett’s Solution Does Not Treat the Cause of the
Underwater Mortgage Crisis at its Source
Every solution is created in order to repair a problem.  In order for
the problem to be repaired, the problem must be properly assessed.  If
a problem is not properly assessed, then the solution created from this
95. 2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 61 Art. 2, at 846–47 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., rev. ed. 1920, reprt. Christian Classics 1981)
(c. 1274).
96. 3 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 57 Art. 1, at 1425 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., rev. ed. 1920, reprt. Christian Classics 1981)
(c. 1274).
97. Id., Q. 58 Art. 1, at 1429.
98. Id., Q. 58 Art. 5, at 1431–32.
99. Id.
100. Id., Q. 58 Art. 6, at 1432–33.
101. Id.
102. Aquinas, supra note 96, Q. 58 Art. 5 at 1431–32.
103. Id., Q. 58 Art. 5 at 1432–33.
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assessment will not be very useful, nor will it solve the problem.  Ad-
ditionally, every problem seeks a permanent solution.  If a problem is
to be permanently solved, the solution must attack the problem at the
problem’s source.  Therefore, if a solution does not attack a problem
at its source, then the problem always has the chance of resurfacing
and is not a true, permanent solution.  A solution that is incapable of
eliminating a crisis due to a lack of understanding the root cause of
the crisis is unlikely to prevent the recurrence of that same crisis.  This
sort of “solution” is clearly not in the best interest of the American
community.
Therefore, since it has been shown that Professor Hockett’s assess-
ment of how the mortgage crisis was created is incorrect,104 and if it
can now be shown that his solution does not seek a permanent solu-
tion, then it will quickly become clear that Hockett’s solution is inca-
pable of ensuring that the crisis disappears; and a solution that is
incapable of ensuring that the crisis disappears cannot be what is in
the best interest of the community.
If a permanent solution to a problem is desired, then the most logi-
cal approach to solving the problem is to fix the problem where it
originated.  While it might take less time and/or resources to simply
clean up the mess that the problem created, this will not create a per-
manent solution.  The common good of the community might tempo-
rarily benefit from a “quick fix,” but the common good of the
community will benefit much more from a permanent solution.  There
may be certain situations where a community may decide that it would
be more economically advantageous for the community to opt for the
quick fix rather than the permanent solution; however, the Author
does not find it to be a stretch to say that a permanent solution is what
is needed for the underwater mortgage crisis.
Imagine a community of homeowners.  Since moving in, each
homeowner has noticed that his or her pipe underneath their master
bathroom sink leaks in the middle of the night for an unknown reason.
One solution is for each community member to hire Sam’s Water
Clean Up to come to his or her house every afternoon to clean up the
water from the leaking pipes.  While inefficient, this is a solution inso-
far as each homeowner will come home from work each evening to
find a bathroom floor that is free of water.  However, the better, per-
manent solution is to treat the problem at its source by fixing or re-
pairing the pipe so that the leaking no longer occurs.  While the
former option is a temporary solution that must be applied over and
over again, the latter is capable of resolving the problem permanently.
Furthermore, by completely removing the problem the community
will no longer have to continuously deal with the problem, will not
have to spend unnecessary money on Sam’s Water Clean Up, and will
104. Refer to pages 8–20 of this note.
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not risk any further damage that could be created from the bathroom
sink and floor being consistently wet.
Professor Hockett’s solution to the underwater mortgage crisis is
similar to hiring Sam’s Water Clean Up rather than assessing and fix-
ing the root cause of the problem and eliminating the recurrence of
the leak.  Hockett’s solution does not provide a permanent solution to
the underwater mortgage crisis; in fact, it clearly leaves the American
people at risk for another crisis to occur.  For example, Professor
Hockett’s solution does not call for any of the criminal or civil mea-
sures against these financial institutions.105  Why would these individ-
uals change their behavior if they know they will face no
consequences for their actions?  The good of a community is not
served when people are able to freely commit crimes without
consequence.
Furthermore, Hockett suggests that it is unimportant to try and find
the cause of the current underwater mortgage crisis.106  This theory is
problematic because the good of a community is not served when that
community does not attempt to uncover the origin of its mistakes.  It
is difficult to prevent a leak from repeatedly occurring without first
accurately determining the root cause of the leak and then making
repairs to ensure the initial cause of the leak does not return.  To ben-
efit the entire United States community, actions must be taken to
eliminate the root cause of the underwater mortgage crisis in order to
drastically decrease the likelihood of a recurrence.  The fact that Pro-
fessor Hockett’s solution does not address the issue in a way that
would prevent the crisis from happening again is one of the many rea-
sons why it is unethical and not in the best interest of the American
community.  What is in the best interest of the United States commu-
nity is to implement a solution to the underwater mortgage crisis that
addresses the crisis at its origin and ensures that it can never occur
again.
C. Robert Hockett’s Solution Does Not Hold Those Who Created
the Underwater Mortgage Crisis Accountable
The fact that no executives have been held criminally or civilly lia-
ble for their actions, coupled with the fact that Hockett does not find
this to be an issue, is further reason why Professor Hockett’s solution
is not in the best interest of the American community.  As suggested,
this issue will be dealt with in two prongs.  First, the issue of why there
is currently no incentive for the executives of these financial institu-
tions to change their behavior will be addressed.  Second, the issue of
why there is a lack of civil suits being filed against the executives of
105. See generally Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation
Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value
Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121 (2013).
106. Hockett, supra note 7, at 130.
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these companies will be addressed.  And, again, the fact that both of
these issues are not issues for Hockett provides more reason why his
solution is not in America’s best interest.
1. Criminal Liability
If a permanent solution to the underwater mortgage crisis is really
desired, then it logically follows that one of the goals of the solution
must be to prevent the crisis from occurring again.  However, there is
currently no reason for the executives who caused the underwater
mortgage crisis to exhibit behavior different than the behavior that
caused the current crisis.  As explained, not one executive to date is
facing criminal charges for his or her actions.107  This poses a signifi-
cant problem.  If there is no reason for these individuals to act differ-
ently, then there is nothing preventing history from repeating itself.
Frankly, there is little reason to attempt to solve the crisis if it is prac-
tically inevitable that the crisis will occur again.
Hockett’s solution is not in the best interest of the community be-
cause it specifically avoids punishing the culprits.108  In fact, Hockett
says that assessing blame is a waste of time.109  This could not be fur-
ther from the truth about what is needed to solve the crisis.  It is obvi-
ously in the best interest of the American community to implement a
solution that will permanently solve the problem, and to do this the
culprits must be identified and sufficiently punished.  It is a futile exer-
cise to clean up a mess that will almost certainly be created again, and
if these executives are not held accountable then they have no reason
not to continue exhibiting the same behavior.  Furthermore, this can
lead others to view this as acceptable behavior because they see it
going unpunished.  The ethically correct course of action to take is to
ensure that something like this never happens again.  Professor Hock-
ett’s solution does not provide this assurance.
2. Civil Liability
Another logical method of dealing with this crisis is to hold these
executives civilly liable.  Our civil justice system is based on the princi-
ple that when person or entity X harms person or entity Y, X should
be responsible for compensating for the damages incurred by Y.  Yet,
somehow this method of justice has not been applied to the culprits of
the current underwater mortgage crisis.  Furthermore, Hockett does
not mention this type of solution anywhere in his writings.  As ex-
plained, Hockett says that the focus should not be placed on pointing
fingers but rather focusing on cleaning up the current wreckage.110
107. Biktimirov, supra note 48, at 212.
108. Hockett, supra note 7, at 130.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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As if the lack of criminal charges facing corporate executives was
not enough, the top five executives at Lehman Brothers made over a
billion dollars between 2000 and 2007, and these individuals were able
to keep all of this money.111  Stan O’Neil, the former CEO of Merrill
Lynch, was able to walk away from a company that was driven into
the ground with a severance package valued at $161 million.112  Again,
one of the most baffling aspects of the underwater mortgage crisis is
the fact that these executives were able to walk away from the damage
they caused without any criminal consequence and without being re-
quired to put the money that they earned unethically back into the
housing market.
The Author will not attempt to determine a hypothetical dollar
amount for which these executives might have been charged in a civil
suit; and even if a civil suit had taken place and the judgment had
been in the billions of dollars, there is no way to know if this would
have been able to save the country from the underwater mortgage
crisis and the economic collapse that followed.  What is highly proba-
ble is that if such a suit had taken place and the culprits were charged
according to the damage caused, the likelihood of a recurrence would
be greatly diminished.  Instead, there has been no case, no judgment,
and no repercussion of any magnitude for the culpable parties.  There
has clearly been a lack of adherence to the principle of when person
or entity X has harmed person or entity Y, X should be responsible
for compensating for the damages incurred by Y in relation to this
crisis.
Just as Professor Hockett’s solution mentions nothing about holding
these executives criminally liable, his solution also mentions nothing
about holding these executives civilly liable.  This is not in the best
interest of the American community.  One of the primary duties of
our judicial system is to punish and prevent crime.  To not utilize the
purpose of our judicial system concerning the current underwater
mortgage crisis is not in the best interest of the community.  There-
fore, a solution, like Hockett’s, that lacks any use of the American
judicial system cannot be in the best interest of the community.
D. Robert Hockett’s Solution Requires Valid
Contracts to be Broken
Another reason why Professor Hockett’s solution to the underwater
mortgage crisis is not tailored to the common good of the community
is that it requires valid, legal contracts to be broken.113  The breaking
of these contracts would require banks to take a forced loss.114  This
would be the equivalent of A lending money to B so B could make a
111. INSIDE JOB, supra note 45, at 25.
112. Id. at 57.
113. Hockett, supra note 10, at 3.
114. Id.
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large purchase and then the government stepping in and telling A that
it no longer has a right to get its money back.  What is even more of a
problem is the fact that Professor Hockett has defined this loss as a
“raise in value.”115  In a recent paper, Professor Hockett falsely states
that write-downs have the important advantage of raising value.116
Hockett’s explanation for how write-downs raise or create value in
mortgages is as follows: “Bank officers know that underwater loans
foreclose at high rates, with the result that expected values fall need-
lessly short of face values; hence, they find it financially rational to
write down these loans.”117  In other words, it would be better for
these banks to receive a “guaranteed” smaller amount than an “un-
guaranteed” larger amount.
In an e-mail the Author received from Professor Hockett, Hockett
explained that there is surplus generated by write-downs because
write-downs lower default risk.118  In other words, if there is a home
mortgage note worth $400,000 that is underwater and is therefore
worth only $300,000 at market value, the lending banks would rather
write down the mortgage to market value and have a greater chance
of collecting $300,000 and avoiding foreclosure than a lesser chance of
collecting $400,000.  This higher chance of receiving less money is
what Hockett has coined a “raise in value.”
However, the problem with Hockett’s explanation is that even if
these lending institutions do find it in their best interest to write-down
mortgages, this still does not create value.  What write-downs do is
make it statistically more likely that the lending institutions will re-
ceive a dollar amount that is smaller than the larger amount the bank
is owed and is statistically less likely to receive.  This is not a creation
in value.  On the contrary, this is an undeniable loss.  If any bank
agrees to only receive $300,000 on a $400,000 mortgage, the Author
guarantees that the bank accounts for a $100,000 loss.
Furthermore, it does not benefit the American community for local
governments to use their eminent domain powers to force the sever-
ance of contracts that both parties agreed to and signed.  At the time
both parties signed the contract, the parties should have recognized
that there are always certain risks that come with contractual agree-
ments.  If a party does not want to bear the threat of that risk, then
the party should not enter into the contract.  It is not in the best inter-
est of the community to not force those who freely entered into a
contract to not be accountable for that contract.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3.
118. E-mail from Robert C. Hockett. Professor of Law, Cornell University Law
School, to Cooper M. Walker, J.D. Candidate, 2015, Texas A&M University School of
Law (Dec. 13, 2013, 08:51 PM CST) (on file with the author).
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E. Robert Hockett’s Solution has no Likelihood of Being Any
More Efficient than Leaving the Housing Market Alone
Another reason why Professor Hockett’s solution to the underwater
mortgage crisis is not tailored to what is in the best interest of the
American community is that the solution does not have a strong likeli-
hood of getting mortgages out of an underwater status any more
quickly or efficiently than letting the housing market balance itself
out.119  In the last quarter of 2011 there were 12.1 million residential
properties with underwater mortgages.120  In September of 2013 there
were only 6.4 million residential properties with underwater mort-
gages.121  Thus, in the past two years, with no plan or solution being
implemented, the number of residential properties with underwater
mortgages has nearly been cut in half.122
Professor Hockett explains that only certain homes will be eligible
for his eminent domain solution.  The reason for this is to provide
security for the parties involved.123  Thus, only mortgages that have a
high likelihood of being brought out of underwater status will qualify
for the plan.124  Under these rules, Professor Hockett says that in Cali-
fornia just fewer than 1.5 million homes will qualify for the plan.125
However, Professor Hockett is not able to back this number up with
any empirical evidence—after stating the number of homes that will
be eligible in California no citation is provided that shows where this
information is coming from.126  Even if it is assumed that Professor
Hockett’s numbers are accurate, this means that roughly 75% of
homes in California with underwater mortgages will qualify.  There-
fore, with no solution or plan in place there has been a 50% drop in
underwater mortgages,127 and if Professor Hockett’s plan has a 100%
success rate, then 75% of mortgages in California will no longer be
underwater.  However, there is no way to know how many mortgages
will be taken out of underwater status.  Furthermore, the threat of
severe unintended consequences negatively affecting the housing mar-
119. See generally Les Christie, 2.5 Million Mortgage Borrowers No Longer Under-
water, CNNMONEY, (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/10/
real_estate/underwater-borrowers/.
120. Bill Campbell, CoreLogic Reports Negative Equity Decreases in First Quarter
of 2012, CORELOGIC (July 12, 2012), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/core-
logic-reports-negative-equity-decreases-in-first-quarter-of-2012.aspx.
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ket and the economy is significant with a plan that has never been
implemented.
The Author finds no reason to, more than five years since the begin-
ning of the underwater mortgage crisis, try and implement Professor
Hockett’s plan if the underwater mortgage crisis is already being
solved.  It is not in the best interest in the American community to
implement a plan that would significantly affect the financial mar-
ket—with potential catastrophic unintended consequences—in order
to solve a problem that is already solving itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Author has now shown the American community—specifically
the legal community who is in charge of deciding how to handle the
current underwater mortgage crisis—that Professor Hockett’s solution
is not in the best interest of the community.  The Author is confident
that an unbiased, open-minded reader will naturally develop an intui-
tive sense for why Hockett’s solution is not in the best interest of the
community from reading the first four Sections of this Comment.
However, in order to solidify the fact that Hockett’s solution is not
appropriate, the Author has implemented the legal philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas.  Specifically, the Author utilized Aquinas’s idea of
what is legally just to provide numerous factual and logical reasons
why Hockett’s solution is neither ethically correct nor appropriate.
First, it was shown that Professor Hockett’s solution does not treat
the cause of the underwater mortgage crisis at its source.  Then, it was
shown that Hockett’s solution does not hold those who created the
underwater mortgage crisis accountable either criminally or civilly.  It
was then shown that Hockett’s solution requires valid contracts to be
broken.  Lastly, it was shown that Hockett’s solution has no likelihood
of being any more efficient than leaving the housing market alone.
The Author hopes that those who will soon be deciding whether to
implement Professor Hockett’s solution will take the time to read this
Comment.
